Netskope Threat Labs

Summary

On November 16, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s Experimentation platform and injected malicious JavaScript into the web snippets of 178 customer organizations. Optimizely is an A/B testing platform. Its snippet runs on every page of a customer’s site and is served from cdn.optimizely.com. Victim brands included BBC, CNN, Salesforce, Zoom, HSBC, and IKEA. Report URI published the full write-up.

Between November 12 and 17, users at hundreds of Netskope customer organizations requested at least one of the attacker’s domains, almost always while browsing an affected brand site. Netskope blocked the vast majority of these requests. This post covers the attack chain, the campaign in our telemetry, and the protections that stopped it.

Key findings

  • A trusted CDN as the delivery path
    The malicious code rode inside the Optimizely snippet served from cdn.optimizely.com, so it ran on every page of 178 major brand sites without touching their own infrastructure.
  • Infrastructure staged ahead of the main wave
    The iOS router domain showed up in our traffic on November 10, six days before the Optimizely injection, and an earlier wave through other third-party scripts started in September.
  • Newly registered domain policies did most of the blocking
    The attacker registered every domain within days or hours of use. URL category rules for Newly Registered Domain and Security Risk blocked most requests before the domains showed up in threat intelligence.
  • Most exploit-domain traffic came from desktops
    The injected script fetched the iOS exploit domains from Windows and macOS browsers too, where the exploits can’t run, and nearly all iOS devices that reached them were on iOS 27, which none of the published chains target.

Attack chain

The injected payload

The modified snippet loaded a second script, track.js, from 1688360[.]cc. That script did several things:

  • skimmed card numbers from payment forms
  • swapped crypto wallet addresses when they were copied
  • sent cookies and screenshots back to the attacker
  • pulled in an iOS exploit chain (Coruna and DarkSword) that targets iOS 13–18, plus a newer chain for iOS 26

The iOS exploit chain

The iOS part went through a few steps. A router domain fingerprinted the device, a second domain delivered the exploit, and a third collected telemetry from the kit.

flowchart LR
    A[Infected site] --> B[cdn.optimizely.com]
    B --> C["1688360[.]cc/track.js"]
    C --> D[Skimmer / wallet swap / cookie theft]
    C --> E["5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu<br/>iOS router"]
    E --> F["eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu<br/>exploit delivery"]
    F --> G["l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu<br/>kit telemetry"]

An earlier wave

A smaller wave, which started in September and spiked on November 13, used webshell[.]lol and went through other third-party scripts (Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media). Most of the affected Optimizely snippets were cleaned up on the evening of the 16th, and the C2 went offline at 00:37 UTC on the 17th.

Activity in Netskope telemetry

Timeline (UTC)

WhenWhat we saw
12 Sep 2026webshell[.]lol first seen, at low volume
10 Nov 20265vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu (iOS router) first seen, the day after it was registered and well before the Optimizely wave
13 Nov 2026webshell[.]lol traffic spikes sharply
16 Nov 2026, 07:541688360[.]cc (track.js) first seen
16 Nov 2026, 17:05eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu (exploit delivery) first seen
16 Nov 2026, 17:46l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu (kit telemetry) first seen
16 Nov 2026, 21:16last request to eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu
17 Nov 2026, 11:38last request to 1688360[.]cc (from pages still cached in browsers)

Who reached the attacker’s domains

DomainRoleWho requested it
1688360[.]ccmain payload (track.js)the most widespread, several thousand users
webshell[.]lolearlier wavearound a thousand users
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icuexploit deliverya few hundred users (mostly Windows and macOS). Only a couple of dozen iOS devices
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuiOS routerunder two hundred (a mix of desktop and iOS). Around 60 iOS devices
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icukit telemetrya couple of dozen, nearly all Windows

Most requests to the exploit and telemetry domains came from Windows and Mac computers. The injected script fetched these domains from desktop browsers too, and the iOS exploits can’t run on those. So a hit on these domains alone doesn’t mean an iPhone was targeted. Nearly all the iOS devices that reached them were on iOS 27, which none of the published chains target, as far as we know.

Conclusions

The attackers didn’t need to breach any of the 178 brands directly. One compromised third-party snippet, served from a CDN those sites already trusted, put a card skimmer, a wallet swapper, and an iOS exploit chain on sites that are among the most visited on the web. Their own infrastructure was the weak point: every domain was freshly registered, which is what let category-based policies stop it before threat feeds caught up. Netskope Threat Labs is also investigating v8hub[.]xyz, a newly registered domain behind Cloudflare that appeared alongside the exploit delivery and telemetry requests, to determine whether it is part of the kit.

Netskope detection

ProtectionShare of activityResult
URL category policy (Security Risk, Newly Registered Domain)most of itblocked, or a warning page shown
Threat intelligence (malicious site list)a significant shareblocked
Inline anti-malwaresmaller share, on the exploit kit pagedetected
Remote Browser Isolationa small number of usersexploit page rendered in isolation, never on the device

URL category policies did most of the work, and the malicious site list blocked much of the rest. Inline anti-malware flagged the exploit kit page itself, while users behind browser isolation loaded the exploit content in an isolated session, so it never ran on their devices.

Recommendations

  • Block the domains and IPs below if you aren’t already, especially if any of your policies are set to alert only.
  • Block newly registered domains on web traffic. Netskope customers can configure their Netskope NG-SWG with a URL filtering policy for the Newly Registered Domain and Security Risk categories, and use Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) where blocking isn’t an option.
  • If any of your users saw an alert for 1688360[.]cc on November 16, ask them whether they entered card details or copied crypto addresses on a large brand’s site that day.
  • Check any iPhone or iPad that contacted 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu or eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, starting with any on iOS 18 or 26.

Data analysis

The analysis presented in this blog post is based on anonymized usage data collected by the Netskope Security Cloud platform relating to a subset of Netskope customers with prior authorization.

IOCs

TypeIndicatorNotes
Domain1688360[.]ccC2, serves track.js
IP136.113.106[.]1361688360[.]cc
Domain5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuiOS router
IP34.96.213[.]2015vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu
Domaineil786npto9u5bq[.]icuExploit delivery, Coruna
IP34.87.36[.]58eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu
Domainl7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuExploit kit telemetry
Domainwebshell[.]lolEarlier-wave injector
Domainje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuFallback C2
Domainq1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icuFallback C2
Domainios-hack[.]icuFallback C2
SHA-256814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0ftrack.js build from 17:13 UTC, 16 Nov
SHA-256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40track.js build from 17:57 UTC, 16 Nov