Summary
On November 16, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s Experimentation platform and injected malicious JavaScript into the web snippets of 178 customer organizations. Optimizely is an A/B testing platform. Its snippet runs on every page of a customer’s site and is served from cdn.optimizely.com. Victim brands included BBC, CNN, Salesforce, Zoom, HSBC, and IKEA. Report URI published the full write-up.
Between November 12 and 17, users at hundreds of Netskope customer organizations requested at least one of the attacker’s domains, almost always while browsing an affected brand site. Netskope blocked the vast majority of these requests. This post covers the attack chain, the campaign in our telemetry, and the protections that stopped it.
Key findings
- A trusted CDN as the delivery path
The malicious code rode inside the Optimizely snippet served fromcdn.optimizely.com, so it ran on every page of 178 major brand sites without touching their own infrastructure. - Infrastructure staged ahead of the main wave
The iOS router domain showed up in our traffic on November 10, six days before the Optimizely injection, and an earlier wave through other third-party scripts started in September. - Newly registered domain policies did most of the blocking
The attacker registered every domain within days or hours of use. URL category rules for Newly Registered Domain and Security Risk blocked most requests before the domains showed up in threat intelligence. - Most exploit-domain traffic came from desktops
The injected script fetched the iOS exploit domains from Windows and macOS browsers too, where the exploits can’t run, and nearly all iOS devices that reached them were on iOS 27, which none of the published chains target.
Attack chain
The injected payload
The modified snippet loaded a second script, track.js, from 1688360[.]cc. That script did several things:
- skimmed card numbers from payment forms
- swapped crypto wallet addresses when they were copied
- sent cookies and screenshots back to the attacker
- pulled in an iOS exploit chain (Coruna and DarkSword) that targets iOS 13–18, plus a newer chain for iOS 26
The iOS exploit chain
The iOS part went through a few steps. A router domain fingerprinted the device, a second domain delivered the exploit, and a third collected telemetry from the kit.
flowchart LR
A[Infected site] --> B[cdn.optimizely.com]
B --> C["1688360[.]cc/track.js"]
C --> D[Skimmer / wallet swap / cookie theft]
C --> E["5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu<br/>iOS router"]
E --> F["eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu<br/>exploit delivery"]
F --> G["l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu<br/>kit telemetry"]
An earlier wave
A smaller wave, which started in September and spiked on November 13, used webshell[.]lol and went through other third-party scripts (Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media). Most of the affected Optimizely snippets were cleaned up on the evening of the 16th, and the C2 went offline at 00:37 UTC on the 17th.
Activity in Netskope telemetry
Timeline (UTC)
| When | What we saw |
|---|---|
| 12 Sep 2026 | webshell[.]lol first seen, at low volume |
| 10 Nov 2026 | 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu (iOS router) first seen, the day after it was registered and well before the Optimizely wave |
| 13 Nov 2026 | webshell[.]lol traffic spikes sharply |
| 16 Nov 2026, 07:54 | 1688360[.]cc (track.js) first seen |
| 16 Nov 2026, 17:05 | eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu (exploit delivery) first seen |
| 16 Nov 2026, 17:46 | l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu (kit telemetry) first seen |
| 16 Nov 2026, 21:16 | last request to eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu |
| 17 Nov 2026, 11:38 | last request to 1688360[.]cc (from pages still cached in browsers) |
Who reached the attacker’s domains
| Domain | Role | Who requested it |
|---|---|---|
1688360[.]cc | main payload (track.js) | the most widespread, several thousand users |
webshell[.]lol | earlier wave | around a thousand users |
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu | exploit delivery | a few hundred users (mostly Windows and macOS). Only a couple of dozen iOS devices |
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu | iOS router | under two hundred (a mix of desktop and iOS). Around 60 iOS devices |
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu | kit telemetry | a couple of dozen, nearly all Windows |
Most requests to the exploit and telemetry domains came from Windows and Mac computers. The injected script fetched these domains from desktop browsers too, and the iOS exploits can’t run on those. So a hit on these domains alone doesn’t mean an iPhone was targeted. Nearly all the iOS devices that reached them were on iOS 27, which none of the published chains target, as far as we know.
Conclusions
The attackers didn’t need to breach any of the 178 brands directly. One compromised third-party snippet, served from a CDN those sites already trusted, put a card skimmer, a wallet swapper, and an iOS exploit chain on sites that are among the most visited on the web. Their own infrastructure was the weak point: every domain was freshly registered, which is what let category-based policies stop it before threat feeds caught up. Netskope Threat Labs is also investigating v8hub[.]xyz, a newly registered domain behind Cloudflare that appeared alongside the exploit delivery and telemetry requests, to determine whether it is part of the kit.
Netskope detection
| Protection | Share of activity | Result |
|---|---|---|
| URL category policy (Security Risk, Newly Registered Domain) | most of it | blocked, or a warning page shown |
| Threat intelligence (malicious site list) | a significant share | blocked |
| Inline anti-malware | smaller share, on the exploit kit page | detected |
| Remote Browser Isolation | a small number of users | exploit page rendered in isolation, never on the device |
URL category policies did most of the work, and the malicious site list blocked much of the rest. Inline anti-malware flagged the exploit kit page itself, while users behind browser isolation loaded the exploit content in an isolated session, so it never ran on their devices.
Recommendations
- Block the domains and IPs below if you aren’t already, especially if any of your policies are set to alert only.
- Block newly registered domains on web traffic. Netskope customers can configure their Netskope NG-SWG with a URL filtering policy for the Newly Registered Domain and Security Risk categories, and use Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) where blocking isn’t an option.
- If any of your users saw an alert for
1688360[.]ccon November 16, ask them whether they entered card details or copied crypto addresses on a large brand’s site that day. - Check any iPhone or iPad that contacted
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuoreil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, starting with any on iOS 18 or 26.
Data analysis
The analysis presented in this blog post is based on anonymized usage data collected by the Netskope Security Cloud platform relating to a subset of Netskope customers with prior authorization.
IOCs
| Type | Indicator | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | 1688360[.]cc | C2, serves track.js |
| IP | 136.113.106[.]136 | 1688360[.]cc |
| Domain | 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu | iOS router |
| IP | 34.96.213[.]201 | 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu |
| Domain | eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu | Exploit delivery, Coruna |
| IP | 34.87.36[.]58 | eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu |
| Domain | l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu | Exploit kit telemetry |
| Domain | webshell[.]lol | Earlier-wave injector |
| Domain | je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu | Fallback C2 |
| Domain | q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu | Fallback C2 |
| Domain | ios-hack[.]icu | Fallback C2 |
| SHA-256 | 814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f | track.js build from 17:13 UTC, 16 Nov |
| SHA-256 | f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 | track.js build from 17:57 UTC, 16 Nov |



